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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LAYTON CITY, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs . 
FRANK R. ARAGON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment entered 
in the Second Circuit Court in accordance with Section 
78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Annotated, 
ISSUES OF APPEAL 
1. Did the Circuit Court err in failing to suppress the 
verbal statement of Defendant obtained by Layton City police 
officers and in admitting such statement into evidence during the 
jury trial. The standard for review as to this issue is whether 
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right of 
self-incrimination as to the claim that a Miranda warning was not 
given to him and this Court does not accord any particular 
deference to the trial court's conclusions but rather reviews 
them for correctness. State v. Sampson, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 
14 (Utah App. 1990) . As a second ground for wrongfully 
admitting the statement of Defendant did the lower court abuse 
its discretion in admitting such statement when the state had 
failed to establish independent evidence of the corpus delicti of 
-1-
Case No. 900247-CA 
Priority No. 2 
driving while under the influence? State v. Anderson, 561 P.2d 
240 (Utah 1977); Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 
1985); Ostler v. Albinia Transfer Co., Inc., 781 P.2d 445, 447 
(Utah App. 1989) . 
2. Excluding the wrongfully admitted statement of the 
defendant, was there sufficient evidence presented by the 
prosecutor to sustain the conviction for driving under the 
influence. The standard of review for this issue is whether 
there is sufficient evidence from which findings of all the 
requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made. State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985); State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 
(Utah 1983). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to 
be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. Amendment 5 to the United 
States Constitution. 
In criminal prosecutions . . . the accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself. Article 1, Section 
12, Utah State Constitution. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction of Defendant in 
the Second Circuit Court, Layton Department, for the offense of 
driving while intoxicated. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On February 7, 1990 an information was filed by the City of 
Layton against defendant Frank Aragon charging him with driving 
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under the influence of alcohol, delaying and obstructing an 
officer, and disorderly conduct. [Note: For some unexplained 
reason there are two separate pleading files which have been 
docketed with the Clerk of this Court. Defendant's counsel does 
not understand the necessity of these two files since they are 
basically in duplicate. The order of the various documents, 
however, is different and some files contain documents that are 
not contained in the other. Since it will occasionally be 
necessary to refer to both files during this brief Appellant will 
designate the file dated May 21, 1990 as File No. I and the file 
dated August 20, 1990 as File No. II.]. 
On August 28, 1989 Defendant moved to dismiss the charges 
filed against him on the basis there was no evidence legally 
sufficient to entitle prosecution and to suppress evidence. 
(R.I., 17) On September 28, 1989 a hearing was held before the 
Honorable K. Roger Bean for the purpose of determining 
Defendant's motion to suppress evidence. (R.I., 121; 101-111). 
The lower court denied Defendant's motion on October 27, 1989. 
(R.I., 95-96; see "Memorandum of Decision" contained in Addendum 
to this Brief). 
On January 9, 1990 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider 
the previous ruling on Defendant's motion to dismiss based upon a 
decision of the Honorable John A. Rokich, Third District Judge, 
in an appeal from the Department of Motor Vehicles determination 
that Defendant would lose his license for failing to submit to a 
blood alcohol test. Judge Rokich reversed the determination of 
the Department and found that the officers had no probable cause 
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to arrest the petitioner for driving under the influence at the 
time the arrest was made. (R.I., 91, 89-90; see "Memorandum of 
Decision", Araqon v. Schwendiman contained in the Addendum to 
this Brief). The lower court on February 7, 1990 denied 
Defendant's motion to reconsider. (R.I., 84; see "Memorandum of 
Decision" dated February 7, 1990 in the Addendum to this Brief). 
A jury trial was held on February 8 and February 9, 1990 
before the Honorable K. Roger Bean. At the conclusion of the 
City's case Defendant moved to dismiss. (Trial Trans., 182-37). 
The lower court denied these motions. (Trial Trans., 188). The 
following day defense counsel presented arguments in support of 
his previous motion to strike any testimony of the defendant that 
had been elicited from the officers making the arrest. The Court 
took this motion under advisement. (R.I., 199). It was never 
ruled upon. A verdict was returned by the jury finding Defendant 
guilty of driving while under the influence of alcohol, guilty of 
delaying and obstructing an officer, and guilty of disorderly 
conduct. (R.I., 12). On April 16, 1990 Defendant was sentenced 
to four days in jail, fined $750 and placed on probation for 
twelve months. (R.I., 10). On May 16 Defendant filed his Notice 
of Appeal. (R.II., 26). This appeal is taken only from the DUI 
conviction. 
On June 19, 1990 Defendant filed an application for a 
Certificate of Probable Cause and Stay requesting the lower court 
to prevent Defendant's license from being suspended during the 
pendency of an appeal to this Court on the basis that the 
suspension of the license would most probably be completed before 
-4-
this Court could review the conviction. The lower court denied a 
stay on the basis that it had no jurisdiction over the driver's 
license division and that such effort would have to be made in 
the District Court or the Court of Appeals. (R.II., 14-15). 
On July 17, 1990 Defendant filed a petition for stay of 
execution pursuant to Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure before this Court. (R.II., 9-13). The matter was 
remanded to the lower court for consideration. After a hearing, 
the district court denied the stay. (R.II., 8). This Court 
subsequently issued an opinion that it would not decide the stay 
issue. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The basic facts in this case are essentially undisputed. 
One or more of the arresting officers testified in four separate 
proceedings related to the incident occurring on April 2, 1989. 
These proceedings included a driver's license revocation hearing 
before the Department of Motor Vehicles, a trial de. novo before 
the Honorable Third District Judge John Rokich in an appeal from 
the Department of Motor Vehicle decision, a hearing concerning 
Defendant's motion to dismiss in the Second Circuit Court, and a 
jury trial in the Second Circuit Court. For purposes of this 
appeal the most complete factual scenario of what occurred on 
April 2, 1989 is contained in the September 28, 1989 suppression 
hearing transcript. As will be noted later in this brief certain 
portions of the evidence that was given during the suppression 
hearing was not introduced during the jury trial because of 
hearsay objections. These exclusions will be noted in detail 
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infra as it relates to the jury trial and the evidence upon which 
Defendant was convicted. However, for purposes of this Brief the 
suppression hearing will be principally utilized as a basis for 
the statement of facts. 
At approximately 1:40 in the morning three Layton City 
officers were dispatched to an address within Layton City on the 
basis that a family fight was in progress. (Suppression Hearing 
transcript, p. 10; hereinafter SH). As the officers arrived they 
observed a male and female standing in a driveway next to a car 
which was running and which had its lights on. The man was 
standing next to the car on the right-hand passenger side. (SH, 
11). A male and a female officer approached the couple who at 
that time did not appear to be having any kind of dispute. (SH, 
12). The female officer began talking to the woman and the male 
officer began talking to the man who was the defendant Frank 
Aragon. 
The conversation between the male officer and Defendant 
became aggitated. The male officer, John Lynch, stated that as 
soon as he began talking to Defendant he could smell alcohol and 
that he noticed Defendant had glassy eyes. (SH, 59). While the 
officer was questioning Defendant, the officer testified that the 
defendant became irritated and started to approach him. The 
officer stated that he pushed him back at which time Defendant 
doubled up his fist and made threatening comments. (SH, 60). As 
the confrontation increased the third officer came up from behind 
and told Defendant that he was under arrest for disorderly 
conduct. The two officers then wrestled the defendant to the 
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ground and handcuffed him. (SH, 61). The defendant sustained an 
injury to his cheek at the time he hit the pavement which was 
lightly termed "road burn". (SH, 41). After the defendant was 
restrained he was told that he was being placed under arrest for 
disorderly conduct. (SHf 20, 68). 
The officers then took the defendant and placed him in the 
back seat of Officer Sharon Beckett's police automobile. (SH, 
19). At that time he was handcuffed, seatbelted and was 
therefore unable to leave the vehicle. (SH, 19). It is 
undisputed that Defendant was not present during any of the 
subsequent conversations that the officers had with various 
individuals. 
Officer Lybbert and Officer Beckett interviewed a woman 
named June Trujillo who was present at the house where the car 
had been parked. Ms. Trujillo told the officers that the 
defendant had been in the house earlier but that he had been 
there with a friend. She said she did not know who the person 
was and that she did not know whose vehicle was in the driveway. 
(SH, 24) . 
In the meantime, the other officer, John Lynch, talked to 
Rose Aragon, Defendant's wife, who was the female standing near 
him at the time the officers came to the scene. Officer Lynch 
asked her how the defendant got to the house and she stated he 
drove. (SH, 62). He then talked to a young lady named Nicki 
Trujillo who also said that Defendant had driven there. (Id.). 
While this questioning was going on by Officer Lynch, Sgt. 
Lybbert and Officer Beckett returned to the police vehicle to 
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question the defendant. At that point Defendant had already been 
placed under arrest for disorderly conduct and was sitting 
quietly in the back seat of the vehicle. The officers opened the 
left rear door of the vehicle in order to talk with him. (SH, 
27). Officer Lybbert asked the defendant who his friend was. 
(SH, 25). He responded that he was there by himself and that he 
had driven there three or four minutes before the police arrived. 
(SH, 28-29, 54-55). 
During this interview with the defendant Sgt. Lynch was 
speaking with June Trujillo. She told him that the defendant had 
come to the house earlier with a friend just as she had 
previously told the same story to Sgt. Lybbert. Officer Lynch 
then talked to Sgt. Lybbert who told him that Defendant said 
there was no friend which made Officer Lynch assume that Ms. 
Trujillo was telling him a story. He therefore returned to her 
and gave her a Miranda warning informing her that if she was 
telling him a story she could be charged with obstructing an 
investigation. At that time she said she didn't know anything. 
(SH, 63). 
Officer Beckett stated that during this period of time that 
Defendant was parked in her police vehicle she did not have any 
information concerning the ownership of the car. (SH, 29). It 
was not until she returned to the jail and ran a vehicle check 
that she discovered that the vehicle parked in the driveway was 
registered to the defendant. (SH, 37). 
Since the defendant was already under arrest while sitting 
in the back of the vehicle Officer Beckett did not believe that 
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she specifcally told him that he was also being placed under 
arrest for driving under the influence- She had been instructed 
by Sgt. Lybbert to file the DUI paperwork since she was the only 
officer still on shift while at the police station. It is 
undisputed that during the entire period at the arrest site and 
in the police vehicle Defendant was never given the Miranda 
warning. (SH, 55). 
Several additional facts which were not brought out in the 
suppression hearing but were elicited during the trial complete 
the factual story. Officer Lybbert testified that upon searching 
the vehicle in the driveway he discovered one full beer can and 
one empty can. (Trial Trans., 117). The car was ultimately 
turned off by June Trujillo. (Trial Trans., 118). Officer 
Lybbert further testified that because of the confusing 
statements given by the witnesses he did not have any real idea 
who drove the automobile to the house until he spoke to Defendant 
who verified that he was the driver. (Trial Trans., 124-130). 
Upon arriving at the jail Officer Beckett asked Defendant if 
he would submit to a breath test. Defendant requested to talk to 
a lawyer at which time he was informed that the right to counsel 
and the right to remain silent does not apply to the implied 
consent law and that he would lose his license if he did not take 
the test. (Trial Trans., 164-65). After Defendant refused to 
take the test Officer Beckett gave him the Miranda warning. When 
asked whether he wished to answer any questions he then informed 
her that he did not. (Trial Trans., 166). Subsequently, 
Defendant informed her that he was now willing to submit to a 
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blood but not a breath test. She did not give him a blood test 
and subsequently placed him in a cell for the evening, (Trial 
Trans., 167). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The lower court erred in failing to suppress the 
statements of Defendant that he was the driver of the automobile 
and that he had driven it there at the scene some three or four 
minutes before the police arrived. This statement should not 
have been allowed to go to the jury for two reasons. First, the 
statement was made while defendant was handcuffed, seatbelted, 
injured and physically restrained in the back of Officer 
Beckett's police vehicle. At no time while he was at the scene 
of the incident or in the police vehicle did he receive the 
Miranda warning. Defendant had already been arrested for 
disorderly conduct and was basically restrained while the 
officers investigated the circumstances. He was neither given a 
Miranda warning for the disorderly conduct charge nor for the 
driving under influence charge even though the officers strongly 
suspected that he had driven the automobile to the scene in an 
intoxicated condition after speaking with several witnesses. 
As a second alternative ground for suppressing the statement 
of the defendant, the State failed to prove the corpus delicti of 
the charge of driving under the influence without the admission 
of the defendant. At trial, the State did not produce any 
witnesses who allegedly saw the defendant driving the automobile 
or could have testified when the automobile was driven and the 
condition of the defendant when he was driving it. Without 
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Defendant's admission that he was the driver and that he had only 
been there three or four minutes there is no evidence sufficient 
to establish a corpus delicti and therefore the admission should 
have been excluded. 
2. When the admission of the defendant is excluded from the 
evidence introduced at trial there is simply nothing left for 
which a jury could convict the defendant of driving under the 
influence. Taking the evidence most favorably for the State 
shows that Defendant was intoxicated while standing next to his 
vehicle which had its motor on and its lights on. Such evidence 
is clearly insufficient to confict Defendant of driving while 
intoxicated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
DURING THE TRIAL THE STATEMENTS OF 
DEFENDANT MADE TO THE ARRESTING 
OFFICERS WHILE RESTRAINED IN A 
POLICE VEHICLE. 
During the jury trial of this matter Officer John Lybbert 
was called as a witness on behalf of the State. 
Q. (By Prosecutor) Okay. You talked to other people 
that were there, too, didn't you? 
A. Yes. I did. 
Q. Okay. And that would be, I guess Rose Aragon? 
A. Yes. Rose Aragon, June Trujillo. 
Q. Okay. And during that conversation with them, you 
discussed the incident as it had occurred? 
A. Yes. I did. 
Q. From that, you made a determination; is that 
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right? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What did you determine? 
A. I determined that Mr. Aragon was the driver of the 
car when it arrived. 
Q. Okay. 
MR. LONG: Your Honor, I would have to move to 
strike that answer as being nonresponsive to the 
question. I mean, there is no way to object when 
he says what conclusion did you make and he comes 
out—off the wall with what he came up with. 
THE COURT: I agree there is no way to object to 
that, but what do you claim as the basis for the 
objection? 
MR. LONG: Well he is going to the truth of the 
matter asserted and he is making a generalization 
as to what he came to this conclusion without even 
the hearsay evidence to base upon his conclusion. 
THE COURT: Well, when we had our conference at 
the bench, this is why I asked you if you wanted 
a limiting instruction because it is relevant as 
to whether or not they had probable cause. 
MR. LONG: Right. 
THE COURT: And of course, he could talk to others 
for that purpose, and he could make that 
determination for that purpose. Would you—all 
right. I deny your motion to strike and to 
instruct the jury to disregard, well, to strike; 
but I do instruct the jury to disregard for the 
purpose— 
Members of the Jury, disregard the witness* last 
answer relative to the elements of the cause of 
action, whether defendant was driving. It's a 
preliminary matter, it's been covered already in 
motions before the court. It's admissible for a 
limited purpose to show that the officer had a 
reason, this officer or some other officer at the 
scene, had a reason to arrest Mr. Aragon at the 
scene, but you should disregard it—that answer 
as to whether or not, for purposes of your 
determinations, Mr. Aragon was driving this motor 
vehicle at this point. You may go ahead. 
-12-
MR. STONEY: Thank you. 
(By Mr. Stoney) Now, at some point in your 
investigation, you actually came back to the car 
where Mr. Aragon had been sitting; is that right? 
Yes. I did. 
He was handcuffed, I believe, and seatbelted in 
the back seat of that car? 
Yes. He was. 
Okay. Was the door open when you were talking to 
him? 
Yes. I opened the door to talk to him. 
Okay. And you reached in and you asked him the 
question "who was your friend". Is that right? 
MR. LONG: I would have to object, Your Honor, 
on the ground that this is— 
MR. STONEY: I'll restate the question, Your 
Honor. I apologize, counsel. 
(By Mr. Stoney) What was the question that you 
asked him? 
The question I asked him was, I asked him, "Where 
is the other person that was in the car with you, 
since I need to talk with him?" 
And did he respond to that? 
He did. 
MR. LONG: I'd have to object to the response, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And the ground? 
MR. LONG: Well, he's handcuffed in the back of 
the police car, he's under arrest and he hasn't 
been given the Miranda warning, and they are 
interrogating him. 
MR. STONEY: Your Honor, if I could remind the 
Court that underneath the voluntary exception in 
the Miranda warnings, the officer is allowed to 
ask a few basic questions. Here in this 
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question, the officer had no reason to believe 
that there would be an incriminating response 
come in. That's why the defendant's response 
becomes important, because if that response is 
incriminating, it's unresponsive to the question 
that he asked. His question is, "Where is your 
friend?" It has nothing to do with incriminating 
him in the process. The officer here is 
impounding a car, he's got a vehicle with him, 
he's got—and he is merely asking where the 
friend is, so it's completely unresponsive to 
what the officer has to say. 
MR. LONG: But the response is incriminating, as 
we know. 
THE COURT: Well, but what about the fact that 
it isn't responsive to the question? 
MR. LONG: Well, it is responsive to the 
question. 
THE COURT: He's received—testimony so far is 
that he's received information somebody else 
drove it. 
MR. LONG: Well, but it is response to the 
question. It's just more encompassing than 
the question asked, which is what the last 
officer was attempting to do. Answer the 
question and then go on and explain some 
other things as well, that were not— 
THE COURT: Objection is overruled. You may 
go ahead, Mr. Stoney. 
MR. STONEY: Thank you. 
Q. (By Mr. Stoney) Officer, what was the 
defendant's answer to the question, and I 
believe it was, "where is the other person?" 
A. Mr. Aragon stated to me "there isn't anyone 
else with me, I was alone when I drove here." 
(Trial Trans., 100-104). 
Officer Sharron Beckett who was also present during the 
conversation with the defendant also was allowed to testify 
concerning this conversation. The following dialogue occurr 
redirect examination by the prosecutor. 
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Q. Prior to the time when the defendant was 
wrestled and handcuffed to the ground, he 
did make some statements regarding the 
actual time that he had arrived, did he not? 
A. Prior to that, I didn't hear a time frame, 
Q. Did you hear him make statements then, at 
some point? 
A. Yes- I did. 
Q. Okay. When was that that he made statements 
about when he had arrived? 
A. When he was in my patrol car. 
Q. Were they in response to a direct question 
or was he just making statements to you? 
A. He was answering a question of Sgt. Lybbert's. 
Q. Which, was that the question that you discussed 
yesterday, about whwere was this other person, 
or whatever the question was? 
A. It was in regards to where his friend was. 
Q. Un huh, and the answer to that question, we 
discussed yesterday, but he also added some-
thing to that, did he not, about his time of 
arrival? 
A. Yes. He did. 
MR. LONG: Your Honor, I'd have to object on 
grounds of Miranda and corpus delicti of the 
crime, and that this relates, his answer 
relates directly to an interogation by the 
officer. 
THE COURT: Objection is overruled. You may 
continue. 
MR. STONEY: Thank you. 
Q. (By Mr. Stoney) And what was his response about 
the time that he had just arrived? 
A. I just got here three or four minutes ago. 
(Trial Trans., 230-31). 
During the closing argument Mr. Stoney, the prosecutor, made 
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the following statement to the jury: 
So, the first one, with regard to—and we'll go to 
the DUI, first of all, the driving under the influence. 
It starts out, number 1, that on or about the second 
day of April, 1989, the defendant drove a vehicle, or 
was in actual physical control—or excuse me, just 
drove a vehicle. I apologize for that last part. 
Drove a vehicle. 
Now, if he drove a vehicle to that situation, if 
you believe that he drove a vehicle, you've heard the 
testimony, you've heard his admissions, you've heard 
that the vehicle was running, the lights were on, the 
officers were there, other people, you've heard the 
whole situation; then the prosecution's met that 
element. I would suggest to you that the prosecution 
has met that element, because there has been no 
contradictory evidence whatsoever to that. (Trial 
Trans., 247) . 
On rebuttal during the argument to the jury the prosecutor 
made the following remarks: 
Really, what it comes back to is the facts. They 
arrive at the scene, there's a car there, running, 
there's lights on. There is an argument going on. An 
officer approaches and Aragon starts in. That's what 
occurred with respect to it. 
Was he driving? Well he admitted to driving. 
Now, I guess nobody is calling him a liar. How soon 
was he driving? Three to four minutes before the 
officers got there. Three to four minutes, that's what 
he said. I was driving. Nobody's accusing him of 
lying. He was driving. There isn't any question about 
that, there's no evidence to tell you that he wasn't 
driving. (Trial Trans., 269). 
Although the information filed in this case originally 
charged Defendant with two separate offenses; i.e., driving while 
intoxicated and having actual physical control of a vehicle while 
intoxicated. (R.I, 125). The prosecutor and the court 
subsequently agreed that actual physical control was not an issue 
in the case and that only driving was relevant. (Trial Trans., 
209; R.I, 16, 20). Thus, in order for Defendant to be convicted 
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of driving under the influence it was necessary as stated in the 
jury instructions to find "beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the 
following elements of that offense: (1) that on or about the 
second day of April, 1989 Defendant drove a vehicle and (2) that 
at the time Defendant was under the influence of alcohol to a 
degree which rendered him incapable of safely driving a vehicle." 
(R.I, 20). 
For purposes of this appeal, Defendant will concede that 
there was sufficient evidence in the opinion of the arresting 
officers that Defendant was intoxicated and was incapable of 
operating a vehicle. The sole issue of this appeal was whether 
there was sufficient evidence to show that the defendant was 
driving a vehicle at the time of such intoxication. As such, 
therefore, the statements made by the defendant were critical to 
establishing this element of the offense and it was prejudicial 
error to admit such statements for two distinct and separate 
reasons. 
First, the statements given to the officers occurred at a 
time when Defendant was clearly in custody after having been 
arrested on disorderly conduct and at a time when a Miranda 
warning should have preceded any questioning of the defendant. 
Since no Miranda warning was given until much later at the police 
station any statement made by the defendant was inadmissible. 
Second, at trial the prosecutor failed to establish by 
independent competent evidence that Defendant had driven the 
vehicle while intoxicated and the admission by Defendant is 
insufficient to establish the corpus delicti of a crime without 
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other competent corroborating evidence. Here there was none. 
These two reasons for excluding Defendant's statements will 
now be addressed. 
A. Because Defendant Was Not Given the 
Miranda Warning as Required by the United 
States Supreme Court His Right of Federal 
and State Self-incrimination Was Violated 
and any Statements Were Inadmissible at 
His Trial. 
During the suppression hearing the lower court and defense 
attorney discussed the concept of requiring a Miranda warning in 
this case. The Court's subsequent denial of Defendant's motion 
for suppression was based upon this dialogue. The following 
statements occurred: 
THE COURT: All right. You're not taking the 
position, I gather, that once a person is 
arrested for one offense, that they couldn't 
then arrest for another? 
MR. LONG: No, if they had probable cause— 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. LONG: —at the time of the arrest. 
THE COURT: Well, they could investigate while 
that person is under arrest, the fact that that 
person may have committed another offense. The 
prosecution would have the right to do that, 
wouldn't they? 
MR. LONG: Without Miranda warnings? 
THE COURT: Well, investigate, yes. Without 
Miranda warnings, unless the nature of the 
investigation is such that it does require 
Miranda warnings. 
MR. LONG: Well, I think absolutely it requires 
the Miranda warnings. 
THE COURT: Well, it does, if they are going to 
interrogate in a custodial situation under the 
kinds of circumstances Miranda dictates. 
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MR, LONG: Well, I don't see how much more 
custodial you can get than to have handcuffs on 
and sitting in the back of a police car. 
THE COURT: Well, you can get more custodial, 
Miranda talks about it. You can be isolated 
for a period of time from outside contact, you 
can be—feel that you are cut off from the world 
and so forth. He's sitting in the back seat of 
a car, his wife standing not far from there, I 
guess, and—but I'm not—you know—I'm not 
prepared to debate that at this time; but I'm 
just saying so far—you're not taking the 
position that they could not go ahead and 
investigate, aside from asking him questions 
without giving the Miranda warning, they could 
do any other kind of investigation they wanted, 
couldn't they? 
MR. LONG: Well, in this particular case, she 
had no information at that time. 
THE COURT: Well, my question isn't that. My 
question is, could they investigate? 
MR. LONG: Well, I would respond by—by quoting 
the language from the earner case in 1983, 
which is still the law in Utah. An accused must 
be apprised of his Miranda rights if the setting 
is custodial rather than investigatory. In other 
words, at the point environment become custodial 
or accusatory, all police questions must be 
prefaced with Miranda warnings. 
THE COURT: Well, but aren't you between a rock 
and a hard place a little bit here? His custody 
is not related to the offense they are doing an 
investigation on; his custody is for disorderly 
conduct. 
MR. LONG: So, if someone is being interrogated 
after being placed under arrest for being the 
Boston Strangler and he confesses to other 
crimes, that's all right? 
THE COURT: Yeh, if they're not, they're 
interrogating him and under the intense 
interrogation that I think Miranda is directed 
to, if he confesses to an improper left turn, 
couldn't they charge him on that? 
MR. LONG: Absolutely not. I mean, the language 
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is clear. It says all police questions, that 
includes his name, his address, and his social 
security number; all police questions. That's 
the language of the Supreme Court. (Suppression 
Hearing, pp. 72-75). 
The lower court committed fundamental error in allowing 
these admissions to go before the jury. In 1966 the United 
States Supreme Court in the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966) held that once a person was subject to 
"custodial interrogation" it was required that a police officer 
advise him of his constitutional rights including the right to 
remain silent before any further interrogation could occur. The 
court defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated 
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into 
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way." Id. at 444. Later, in California v. Behler, 
463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (per curium) the court stated that "the 
ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or 
restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a 
formal arrest." Id. at 1125. In a still later case the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the test of custody is an objective one, 
i.e., that "the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in 
the suspect position would have understood his situation." 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). 
This Court in the recent case of State v. Sampson, 143 
Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Sept. 11, 1990) reviewed the federal and state 
cases concerning custodial interrogation. This Court stated: 
The Utah Supreme Court has identified several key 
factors to consider in order to determine when a 
defendant who has not been formally arrested is in 
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custody. They are (1) the site of interrogation; (2) 
whether the investigation focused on the accused; (3) 
whether the objective indicia of arrest were present; 
and (4) the length and form of interrogation. Salt 
Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983). 
Another factor which we find pertinent to our 
analysis was recognized by our Oregon counterpart 
in State v. Herrera, 621 P.2d 1209 (Or. App. 
1980). That factor is (5) whether the defendant came 
to the place of interrogation freely and willingly. 
Id. at 1212. 143 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15. 
Thus, the law is crystal clear as to the requirement of a 
Miranda warning when a person has either been accused of a crime 
which results in a custodial interrogation or has in fact been 
arrested because he is charged with a crime. The Supreme Court 
in Berkemer, supra, specifically applied the Miranda requirement 
to cases involving traffic offenses. The Court stated " [a person 
subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to the benefit 
of the procedural safeguards ennunciated in Miranda, regardless 
of the nature or severity of the offense of which he is suspected 
or for which he is charged." 468 U.S. at 439. 
The court in Berkemer specifically applied Miranda 
warnings to traffic violations. It stated, "If a motorist who 
has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is 
subject to treatment that renders him in custody* for practical 
purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections 
prescribed by Miranda. 468 U.S. at 440. 
The officers in this case should have given Defendant a 
Miranda warning for two separate and distinct reasons. First, at 
the time he was arrested for disorderly conduct the warning 
clearly should have been given since he was handcuffed and placed 
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into custody. Second, at the time the investigation on drunk 
driving focused upon the accused based upon the questioning of 
the other witnesses Defendant should have been given the Miranda 
warning before being asked any statements concerning the 
circumstances then existing. 
The question asked by Officer Lybbert concerning the 
defendant's alleged friend was directed to the defendant for the 
purpose of learning who had driven the automobile to the 
investigation scene based upon the statement of Mrs. Trujillo. 
Since it was essential for the officers to learn whether 
Defendant had driven the vehicle to the scene in an intoxicated 
condition such questioning regardless of how indirect requires 
the Miranda warning. Thus, even if he had not been previously 
arrested a Miranda warning would have been required. In this 
case, however, since he was clearly under custodial restraint 
there is no question but that the Miranda warning should have 
been given before any statements concerning any of the charges 
was obtained. 
A number of cases from other jurisdictions support 
Defendant's contention that these statements should have been 
suppressed. In State v. Chapman, 724 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. App. 
1987) an officer responded to a call that an accident had 
occurred on a rural road. Upon arriving the officer found a 
pickup truck had left the road and was twenty feet below in a 
creek bed. At the scene the officer determined that the 
defendant was intoxicated and placed him under arrest for driving 
while intoxicated. At no time was he given the Miranda warning. 
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Subsequently, he was asked a number of questions and the 
defendant established that he had been driving the pickup and 
that the accident occurred less than thirty minutes before the 
officer arrived at the scene* The defendant contended that the 
trial court erred in admitting the incriminating statements he 
made after he was arrested because he had not been given the 
Miranda warning. He raised the objection by a motion to suppress 
which was overruled and a similar motion at trial which was again 
overruled* In reversing the conviction the Court of Appeals 
stated, "It is held that the defendant's incriminating statements 
made after he was arrested and in the absence of a Miranda 
warning were inadmissible." Id. at 715. 
In Tate v. Wells, 650 P.2d 117 (Or. App. 1982) a police 
officer noticed that a motorist was basically in a stupor while 
stopped at a semiphor. The officer approached the defendant's 
car and smelled alcohol on defendant's breath and asked the 
defendant to get out of his automobile and walk in front. The 
officer testified that while he was not absolutely certain that 
defendant was under the influence of an intoxicant that the 
defendant was not free to leave the scene. The officer 
questioned him about his use of alcohol and defendant answered 
several questions about the amount and time that the alcohol 
consumption had occurred. The district court denied defendant's 
motion to suppress the oral admissions made to the officer. 
The Oregon Court of Appeals stated the following: 
The trial court's refusal to suppress defendant's 
oral statements and admissions was error. State v. 
Roberti, 644 P.2d 1104, 646 P.2d 1341 (Or. 1982) 
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[0]nce an officer has decided to arrest a person, it is 
necessary to warn the person of his right to remain 
silent. There was equivocal testimony in this case 
concerning the point at which the officer made that 
decision. However, the other historical facts, 
including that defendant appeared to the officer to 
have been in kind of a "stupor" permit no other 
conclusion than that defendant was not free to leave 
the scene and was in fact under arrest from the time 
the officer saw him walk to the front of his car. 
Statements made thereafter should, under Roberti, 
have been suppressed. Id. at 118-19. 
In Commonwealth v. Meyer, 412 A.2d 517 (Tenn. 1980) a 
police officer while making a routine patrol came upon a car 
which was resting on a guardrail along the highway. The 
defendant was standing within a few feet of the motor vehicle at 
the time of the officer's arrival. The defendant asked the 
officer to call a wrecker to take the car off the guardrail but 
the officer did not call a tow truck and instead called another 
patrol car to assist him. The officer told the defendant he 
would have to wait at the scene until the state police arrived. 
He subsequently asked the defendant to wait in his patrol car. 
The officer waited until two state troopers arrived to 
investigate. The officer told the state troopers that he 
believed the defendant was under the influence of alcohol. The 
state troopers without administering Miranda warnings addressed 
the defendant and asked him what had happened. The defendant 
subsequently gave incriminating statements to the state trooper. 
In ordering suppression of defendant's pre-arrest statement 
the lower court relied upon a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision 
which stated that "Whenever an individual is questioned while in 
custody or while the object of an investigation of which he is 
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the focus, before any questioning begins the individual must be 
given the warnings established in Miranda." Commonwealth v. 
D'Nicuola, 292 A.2d 333 (1972) (emphasis in original). 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower court's 
determination that the state trooper's investigation had 
"focused" on defendant before he addressed him and asked "what 
happened" and therefore should have been given the Miranda 
warning before interrogation. In addition, since defendant 
clearly could not leave the scene of the accident he was held to 
be in actual custody or otherwise significantly deprived of his 
freedom requiring a Miranda warning to be given. 412 A.2d at 
521. 
Finally, in State v. Kingsbury, 460 A.2d 452 (Vt. 1983) 
a police officer noticed a truck weaving badly and stopped it on 
suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. After the 
stop the defendant was asked to perform several sobriety tests 
which he successfully accomplished. The officer then asked 
defendant about the load of lumber and where he had obtained it. 
Being suspicious, the officer detained the defendant at the scene 
until he could call the owner of a local lumber yard who had 
recently been robbed of a load of lumber. The court held that 
any statements made by the defendant prior to his formal arrest 
while waiting for the lumber yard owner to appear were not 
admissible at trial since the defendant was subject to custodial 
interrogation even though he was no longer being held on 
suspicion of drunk driving. 
The preceding cases amply support Defendant's argument that 
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his statements concerning his driving of the vehicle and the time 
in which the vehicle was driven should not have been admissible 
at trial. Contrary to the lower court's reasoning, it is 
difficult to imagine a situation which would more demand the 
giving of the Miranda warning. Here, Defendant was arrested for 
disorderly conduct and placed in handcuffs in the back seat of a 
police vehicle. He was not given the Miranda warning at the time 
of this arrest. Compoundly, while clearly in an extreme 
custodial situation, the police officers began questioning him 
for the purpose of establishing his involvement with the vehicle 
for the purpose of charging him with still another crime. 
It is also interesting to note two ancillary facts. Officer 
Lynch gave June Trujillo the Miranda warning even though he did 
not make any arrest of her when he believed that she was not 
truthfully telling him about the status of the automobile and 
Defendant. Obviously, the warning was being utilized to 
communicate to Mrs. Trujillo the seriousness of her statements 
and in an attempt to make her tell the officer the truth. It is 
strange that Officer Lynch at the time he arrested the defendant 
for disorderly conduct failed to give the same warning to the 
defendant. 
Second, at the time Defendant was taken to the police 
station he was finally given the Miranda warning. At that point 
upon being asked whether he would answer questions of the 
officers he replied that he would not. Clearly, the Miranda 
warning impacted his conduct. 
For these reasons, therefore, the statement of the defendant 
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admitted at trial should have been excluded and it was 
prejudicial error to allow such statements to go to the jury for 
consideration* 
B. As a Separate and Alternative Ground, 
the Lower Court Should Not Have Admitted 
the Statement of the Defendant or Should 
Have Granted a Motion to Strike Such 
Statement Since the Prosecutor Did Not 
Prove the Corpus Delicti of the DUI 
Offense Absent the Defendant's Statements, 
To establish the corpus delicti of a crime the state must 
prove, independent of any admissions made by the defendant, that 
the crime charged in the information was committed. State v. 
Knofler, 563 P.2d 175 (Utah 1977); State v. Anderson, 561 P.2d 
240 (Utah 1977); State v. Erwin, 120 P.2d 285 (Utah 1941). 
Moreover, there must be independent, clear and convincing proof 
of the corpus delicti. State v. Weldon, 314 P.2d 353 (Utah 
1957) . 
The policy behind these rules was stated by the Washington 
Court of Appeals in State v. Hamrick, 576 P.2d 912 (Wash. 
App. 1978). The reasoning why confessions and admissions cannot 
be used to establish the corpus delicti was stated by the court 
as follows: 
This limitation on the use of admissions for 
purposes of the corpus delicti rule is widely accepted 
and is based upon the suspect nature of out-of-court 
concessions. Corroboration of the confession is 
required as a safeguard against the conviction of 
innocent persons through the use of a false confession 
of guilt. E. Cleary, McCormick's Handbook of the Law 
of Evidence, Chap. 14, Sec. 158 (2d Ed. 1972); R. 
Perkins, Criminal Law, Chap. 2, Sec. 1(G) (2d. Ed. 
1969); 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 2071 (3d. Ed. 
1940). See annotation, 40 A.L.R. 460 (1926). 
Extensive safeguards on the use of confessions, 
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such as the doctrine of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966) are a recent development in the law. 
In view of the numerous safeguards against unreliable 
confessions which have developed since the 
corroboration rule, it has been questioned whether the 
corroboration rule still serves a useful purpose.... 
While we have some reservations about the need for the 
corpus delicti corroboration rule, such a requirement 
"does not seem unwise." E. Cleary, supra at 349. 
In many instances the only witness to an encounter 
will be the police officer and the party whose 
admission is the only evidence that a criminal act 
occurred. Under these circumstances, it seems wise to 
adhere to the corpus delicti corroboration rule as a 
protection against potential police abuses. Id. at 
913-14. 
"[T]he corpus delicti of the offenses...may...be established 
by circumstantial as well as direct evidence...provided it is 
sufficient to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that 
of the guilt of the accused." Brown v. State, 405 S.E.2d 785 (Ga. 
1958). As noted by one leading treatise, "In other words, it is 
not enough that circumstantial evidence only offer a reasonable 
basis for believing a defendant to be guilty. The circumstances 
of a case must also exclude every reasonable hypothesis of the 
facts except those consistent with a defendant's guilt. R. 
Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases, Sec. 1.01, pp. 1-23-24 
(3d. Ed. 1990). 
Applying these principles to the instant case shows the 
following. The prosecution clearly had sufficient evidence at 
trial to establish the corpus delicti of disorderly conduct and 
obstructing an officer based upon the observations and testimony 
of the three Layton City officers. The jury had sufficient 
evidence to conclude that Defendant was in fact intoxicated and 
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was acting in a disorderly and obstructing manner. 
As to the third charge, however, of driving while 
intoxicated there was insufficient evidence. It was essential 
as acknowledged by Officer Beckett that the prosecution prove 
both that the defendant was intoxicated and that he was driving 
while intoxicated. In a dialogue between Defendant's attorney 
and Officer Beckett the following occurred: 
Q. So, if there had been someone else who was sober 
and they said they had driven the car there, 
would you have arrested him for driving under 
the influence? 
A. Not if they were not intoxicated. 
Q. So, in other words, someone drinking and 
driving are the critical elements you need to 
put together to charge someone with a crime; 
is that right? 
A. Of driving under the influence? 
Q. Un huh. 
A. They would need to be driving and they would 
need to be under the influence, yes. 
Q. And they would have to be driving a car while 
they were under the influence, wouldnft they? 
A. They would have to have been under the 
influence while they were driving or driving 
while under the influence. 
Q. And were you ever able to ascertain through any 
independent sources, other than Mr. Aragon, 
when he arrived? 
A. Not a definite time, no. 
Q. Did anyone establish that, to your knowledge? 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. So if someone was there who was sober and said 
they had driven there, you wouldn't arrest him; 
but if there was someone there who had been 
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intoxicated you would have arrested them for 
drunk driving? 
A* It would have depended on the circumstances, 
Q. Wouldn't you have to know when they drove there 
and whether they were intoxicated when they 
drove there? 
A. We would have to have had some kind of a time 
frame. (Trial Trans., pp. 219-20). 
Thus, it is evident that to establish the corpus delicti of 
driving under the influence it was necessary for the prosecution 
not only to prove that the defendant had driven the car to the 
location of his wife but that he had actually been intoxicated at 
the time he drove it. In other words, if he had driven the 
automobile to the house and became intoxicated while he was there 
he clearly could not be charged with driving while intoxicated. 
As noted by Professor Erwin, supra, 
If, for example, the defendant is the only victim 
of and witness to a one-car collision, the fact that he 
was driving at the time of the accident, or intoxicated 
when the first witnesses arrived on the scene, or when 
he took a chemical test will not suffice to convict 
him. Instead, the prosecution must prove by direct or 
circumstantial evidence that the defendant's 
intoxicated condition occurred at the same time that he 
was driving. Otherwise, the evidence would be 
insufficient for a conviction for driving while under 
the influence since there was no way of knowing when 
the accident occurred, when the police arrived, or what 
happened between the time of the arrest and the time of 
the accident. See, Erwin, supra, Sec. 1.04, p. 
1-76. (Emphasis added). 
A number of other cases from different jurisdictions support 
Defendant's contention. In State v. Friesen, 725 S.W.2d 638 
(Mo. App. 1987) the defendant was driving with a friend when 
their pickup truck became stuck in a culvert. The two men got 
out of the truck to assess the situation and five minutes later 
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flagged down a highway patrol trooper. The trooper testified 
that when the defendant approached him he stated, "I overshot the 
driveway" thereby implying that he had been the driver when it 
went into the ditch. The trooper stated, however, that at no 
time did he see the defendant or his friend driving or seated in 
the truck. He then asked the defendant if he had been drinking 
and after receiving an affirmative reply arrested him and took 
him into custody where a breath analyzer test was given. 
The Missouri Court of Appeals noted the following: 
The corpus delicti of the offense with which 
defendant was charged required that someone operated a 
motor vehicle while in an intoxicated or drugged 
condition. The record before us establishes that the 
defendant was intoxicated but does not show, either by 
direct or circumstantial evidence, that he or anyone 
else operated the truck while under the influence. 
Indeed the only evidence of the corpus delicti is the 
defendant's statement to Trooper Townsend "I overshot 
the driveway" bringing the facts squarely within the 
rule of Kansas City v. Verstraete, 481 S.W.2d 615 (Mo. 
App. 1972). [In Verstraete the court held that a 
defendant's statement that "he did not think he struck 
anything" was inadmissible since there was no other 
evidence other than defendant's admission to show that 
he had been driving the car.] 
In this case, the state's burden of establishing 
the corpus delicti was made more difficult by the 
presence of Arnold LeFever at the scene. Obviously, he 
may have been the driver, but that possibility was not 
eliminated by the on-the-scene questioning of LeFever 
by either Trooper Townsend or Deputy Buscher. Their 
testimony did not show that LeFever was not the 
driver. 
The corpus delicti cannot be presumed. The state 
has the burden to prove the corpus delicti by legal 
evidence sufficient to show that the crime charged has 
been committed by someone. The state has failed to 
meet the burden of proving the corpus delicti in this 
case. Id. at 640. 
In State v. Hamrick, 576 P.2d 912 (Wash. App. 1978) an 
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investigating officer arrived at an accident scene and found a 
pickup truck in a ditch south of a road and a car 200 feet west 
of the pickup. Both vehicles were damaged and skid marks led to 
the car. The officer testified that upon being interrogated the 
defendant admitted he had been driving the car even though there 
was an occupant in the car at the time. A second trooper also 
testified he had admitted driving the car. 
The lower court dismissed the charge because it refused to 
admit the admission of the defendant concerning his driving. The 
appellate court affirmed and stated: 
Exclusive of defendant's admissions, the state's 
evidence establishes only that defendant was present 
when the officer arrived at the scene of the accident. 
There is no independent evidence of inference 
connecting defendant with control of the car. We do 
not have the slight evidence necessary to logically and 
reasonably deduct that defendant was driving the car. 
Because there is not sufficient independent evidence to 
allow consideration of defendant's admissions, the 
state failed to establish the corpus delicti and the 
trial court properly dismissed the matter. Id. at 
914. 
In summary, while the state proved that defendant was 
intoxicated at the scene of the confrontation it did not prove, 
absent his admissions, that he was in fact the driver of the car 
and that when he did drive the car he was in the same state of 
intoxication as he was when the police officers arrived. Thus, 
in addition to excluding the admission under the Miranda rule 
the court should have excluded it under the corpus delicti rule. 
POINT II 
WITHOUT THE ADMISSIONS BY THE DEFENDANT 
AS TO HIS DRIVING OF THE AUTOMOBILE AND 
THE TIME THE AUTOMOBILE WAS DRIVEN, THE 
STATE PRODUCED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
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ALLOW THE MATTER TO GO TO THE JURY ON 
CHARGES OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
AND THE LOWER COURT SHOULD THEREFORE HAVE 
DISMISSED THIS CHARGE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT• 
Defendant was originally charged with operating and being in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while intoxicated. As this 
Court recently held in Richfield City v. Walker, 131 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 37, 41 (Utah Adv. 1990) statutes similar to this actually 
described two distinct offenses namely; operating a motor vehicle 
and being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle. At 
trial, the state submitted the case solely upon defendant's 
driving of the vehicle. 
Assuming that Defendant's admission as to driving and time 
is excluded then the record shows there is insufficient evidence 
for a conviction. Absent this testimony the only competent 
evidence remaining is the following: (1) the officers observed a 
motor vehicle sitting in a driveway with its lights on and the 
motor running; (2) the motor vehicle was registered in the name 
of Defendant; (3) Defendant was found in an intoxicated condition 
several feet away from the vehicle while standing there with his 
wife. The prosecutor failed to produce any evidence which showed 
that the defendant had driven the car to the scene, or that if he 
did he was in a state of intoxication at that time. In addition, 
there was evidence which created ambiguity such as the fact that 
defendant's wife was standing next to the automobile at the time 
the officers arrived, that there were several other individuals 
immediately near the automobile, and that the automobile was 
ultimately turned off by Mrs. Trujillo and that an empty bottle 
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of beer and a full bottle of beer were found in the car. 
Defendant would refer this Court to State v. Willson, 534 
S.2d 55 (La. App. 1988) as a prime example of insufficiency 
established by the state as to an element of the prima facie 
case. In that case, two deputies received a report of an 
accident and upon arriving at the scene observed a pickup truck 
off the roadway and stuck in the mud. The officers were informed 
by a prior officer who had arrived at the scene earlier that the 
truck was owned by the defendant. The defendant verified he 
owned the vehicle and admitted driving the vehicle to the scene 
but did not specify when he had last operated it. Defendant was 
not observed operating the vehicle by any of the police officers 
nor was he in the vehicle when the initial police officers 
arrived. A half-consumed pint bottle of whiskey was found in the 
bed of the truck. The Court of Appeals of Louisiana dismissed 
the prosecution on the basis that no evidence was presented by 
the state to suggest how long the vehicle was off the road and to 
show that he was intoxicated at the time he drove it. "The 
circumstantial evidence fails to exclude or negate every 
reasonable hypothesis of innocence as required by law." Id. at 
58. 
In a similar type of case, State v. Rutan, 448 S.2d 267 (La. 
App. 1984) the owner of a lounge called police to report an 
accident in the lot of his lounge. An undetermined amount of 
time later, the investigating officer discovered the defendant 
asleep at the controls of his vehicle. The vehicle was damaged, 
the engine was not operating, and the defendant was admittedly 
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intoxicated. In reversing the conviction, the Court of Appeals 
emphasized that the state had presented no evidence to suggest 
defendant had actually operated the vehicle. Furthermore, 
because there was no testimony as to how long after the accident 
the arrest was made, it might just as well be presumed that 
defendant while parked at the lounge never operated the vehicle 
while in an intoxicated state. See also, State v. Lindinger, 357 
S.2d 500 (La. 1978); State v. Phinney, 467 S.2d 1188 (La. App. 
1984) . 
In State v. Chapman, supra, the Missouri Court of 
Appeals after holding that defendant's admissions were improperly 
admitted found the evidence insufficient to support the 
conviction. The court stated: 
The defendant's ownership of the pickup does not 
preclude a reasonable hypothesis that another, perhaps 
one of the Bests, had been driving the pickup. The 
defendant also points out properly admitted evidence 
does not establish the time the pickup was being 
driven. The insufficiency of the evidence in this 
respect is critically analyzed in State v. 
Liebhart, 707 S.W.2d 427 (Mo. App. 1986). For these 
reasons, defendant's contention the properly admitted 
evidence was insufficient to support the conviction has 
merit. cf. State v. Phinney, 460 S.2d 1188 (La. 
App. 1984). IcL- at 716. 
Similarly, in State v. Friesen, supra, once the 
erroneous admission of the defendant had been excluded as 
competent evidence the Court of Appeals held that the state had 
failed to meet its burden of legally sufficient evidence and 
reversed defendant's conviction. 725 S.W.2d at 640. 
Thus, there was insufficient evidence available to the jury 
for it to conclude pursuant to Jury Instruction 9 that (1) on or 
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about the 2nd day of April, 1989 Defendant drove a vehicle and 
(2) that at the time Defendant was under the influence of alcohol 
to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely driving a 
vehicle. (R.I., 20). While the state, for purposes of this 
appeal, proved Defendant was intoxicated it did not prove that he 
was driving while intoxicated and therefore he was not guilty of 
the offense of "driving a motor vehicle while under the influence 
of alcohol." (Jury Instruction 3) (R.I., 16). 
Parenthetically, it might be noted that even had the 
prosecutor and lower court submitted the matter to the jury on 
"actual physical control" under the other provisions of the 
statute that the evidence of Defendant's location some two or 
three feet from the parked vehicle would also be insufficient to 
establish a violation. See, Dearden v. State, 430 P.2d 844 
(Okla. App. 1967); Schram v. District of Columbia, 485 A.2d 623 
(D.C. App. 1984); and Overbee v. Commonwealth, 315 S.E.2d 242 
(Va. 1984). 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court clearly erred in allowing the jury to 
consider the statement of the defendant after he had been placed 
in custody, handcuffed, and restrained in a police car. Clearly 
established federal constitutional law mandated that he be given 
the Miranda warning prior to any statements no matter how 
innocent the state now claims such statements may be. In 
addition, a second ground for suppression of these statements is 
based upon the corpus delicti rule which again has been 
formulated to protect criminal defendants from wrongful police 
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interrogation. 
As this Court recognized in State v. Sampson, supra, that 
while the results in particular cases may be unwelcome, "The 
Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule is clearly dictated by the 
constitution and is the only possible means of protecting the 
value underlying the privilege against self incrimination*" 143 
Utah Adv. Rep, at 18. 
The crime of driving under the influence carries a severe 
penalty to a convicted defendant by the loss of his driver's 
license for a sustained period of time. Thus, the burden upon 
the state to prove all of the necessary elements of this case 
must be strictly monitored in order to prevent convictions on 
improper inferences or illegally obtained evidence. 
For these reasons the conviction of the defendant as to the 
driving under the influence of alcohol charge must be vacated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
/^Larr>^ Long 7 
IOAAU. & tn*d/ 
Craig Sty Cook 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant 
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SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
Davis County, Layton Department 
LAYTON CITY 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANK R. ARAGON 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 
No. 892001620 
Date 2-7-90 
Judge Bean 
MATTER: RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
After argument on the motion, the Court took it under advisement 
1. Defendant focuses on "actual physical control" as that 
phrase is ordinarily used in DUI cases, but that is not the 
basis for the prosecution's claim of probable cause to arrest. 
What the prosecution is saying is that there was circumstantial 
evidence from which Officer Beckett could reasonably conclude 
that defendant had driven to the location where he was found, 
and that he was in the same condition when driving as when 
observed by the officers. 
2. Having reconsidered defendant's motion and the Court's 
earlier ruling on it, the Court finds no basis for changing the 
prior ruling and therefore reaffirms it. 
tjcf 13 \m 
Lv, u 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK R. ARAGON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, 
Director Driver License 
Services, State of Utah, 
Respondents. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 890903616 
This case was tried on the J day of September, 1989, 
The petitioner was present and represented by L. Long, and the 
respondent was represented by Richard D. Wyss. 
The Court heard the testimony of witnesses, admitted 
documentary evidence, read the Memoranda submitted, and heard 
oral argument. The Court took the matter under advisement. 
The Court being fully advised in the premises, makes its 
ruling. 
The Court finds that petitioner was placed under arrest for 
being a disorderly person, and subsequent thereto for driving 
under the influence. 
The arrest for driving under the influence was based upon 
the police officer's observations of the petitioner's conduct, 
ARAGON V, SCHWENDIMAN PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
the smell of alcohol on his breath; and that he was standing 
next to a motor vehicle parked on petitioner's driveway with 
the motor running. The officer had not observed any driving 
violation on the part of the petitioner that could have given 
the officer cause for stopping the petitioner. 
The Court concludes that the arresting officer did not have 
probable cause to arrest the petitioner for driving under the 
influence at the time the arrest was made. The officers could 
not establish at the time of the arrest that the petitioner was 
in actual physical control over the vehicle. Subsequent to the 
arrest, the officer may have obtained sufficient information 
after the arrest to warrant arresting petitioner, but the 
critical time is at the time of the arrest. 
Since the officer did not have probable cause to make the 
arrest, the petitioner would not be required to submit to a 
blood/alcohol test; therefore his license should not be revoked 
for failing to submit to an intoxilyzer test. 
Dated this /J± day of October, 1989. 
Y<uJL.— A y 
VJOliN A. 
v 
ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
Davis County, Layton Department 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 
LAYTON CITY 
Plaintiff, No. 892001620 
vs. Date 10-27-89 
FRANK R. ARAGON 
Defendant 
Judge Bean 
MATTER: DECISION ON DEFENDANTS MOTION 
The Court took this matter under advisement so that applicable 
statutes, court decisions and text authorities could be 
reviewed. That having been done, the Court now finds and 
concludes: 
1. On 5-2-89, defendant filed his motion to dismiss and notice 
of hearing. The basis for the dismissal, set forth in the 
motion, was that "there is no evidence in the case legally 
sufficient to entitle prosecution to a conviction against 
defendant herein." It was heard 5-15-89 by Judge Heffernan, and 
denied. 
2. The clerk set a pretrial, it was continued, and at the later 
date defense counsel moved to suppress evidence. However, no 
written motion to suppress was filed. Hearing was had and 
testimony taken. This judge doesn't know what was argued to 
Judge Heffernan, but has proceeded and is proceeding on the 
assumption, acquiesced in by counsel, that this is a separate 
motion based on different grounds. 
3. The testimony of officers Beckett and Lynch showed that: 
a. The officers were dispatched to a family fight and 
given information that Frank Aragon was beating his 
wife and was about to leave in a black Monte Carlo. 
b. When officer Lynch arrived at the location, 
defendant was standing next to and leaning on a 
black Monte Carlo, parked in the driveway. There 
were other persons at the location. 
c. The car's lights were on and the engine was running. 
2. 
d. Defendant was the registered owner of the car. 
e. Rose Aragon told the officers defendant drove there. 
f. Niki Trujillo told them defendant drove there. 
g. Defendant told them he drove there. 
h. There was an absence of evidence anyone else had 
driven the car there. 
i. There was an absence of evidence defendant had 
arrived there by any other means. 
Utah code sec. 41-6-44(8) says: 
A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person 
for a violation of this section when the officer has 
probable cause to believe the violation has occurred, 
although not in his presence, and if the officer has 
probable cause to believe that the violation was 
committed by the person. 
5. At the hearing on the mot 
position that defendant hadn1 
he was asked whether he'd bee 
his answer was not admissible 
prosecution could not establi 
therefore the case should be 
that is the question passed o 
judge were to consider it now 
Under the Utah decisions on c 
statement would be admissible 
Officer Beckett was permitted 
probable cause for an arrest 
alcohol. 5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest 
ion, defense counsel took the 
t been advised of his rights before 
n driving the car, and therefore 
in evidence, and without it the 
sh the corpus delicti, and 
dismissed. This judge must assume 
n by Judge Heffernan, but if this 
the motion would be denied, 
orpus delicti, defendant's 
at trial, but even if it weren't, 
to consider it to establish 
for driving under the influence of 
, sees. 44, 48. 
5. The Court finds and concludes that officer Beckett, having 
the information set forth in paragraph 3 above, and the 
authority granted in sec. 41-6-44(8), had ample probable cause 
to place defendant under arrest for driving under the influence 
of alcohol. In fact, she had probable cause without considering 
defendant's statement. Layton City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035, 
(1987). Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757, 16 L Ed 2d 908, 86 
S Ct 1826, (1966) . 
Accordingly, defendant's motion to suppr^s evidence is denied. 
Judge 
